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In today’s international system neighboring states tend to build regional or
subregional clusters in order to improve their capability to stand up to the
unprecedented proliferation of new global challenges. This phenomenon has
taken shape as both a political top-down process—which we call regionalism—
and a structural bottom-up process—which we call regionalization.
Regionalism outlines cooperation in the economic, institutional, defense, or
security fields, occurring at a political decision-making level. Regionalization
defines an increase of region-based activity, characterized by undirected
economic and social interactions between nonstate actors whether individuals,
firms, companies, NGOs, etc.
While many attempts at regionalism have been launched in the Middle East
over the last half century, progress has been limited in terms of political,
security, and economic cooperation. Today’s changing political environment,
fostered by the 2011 uprisings, provides unprecedented opportunities for
opening new dimensions of regional cooperation. The disruptive demand for
democracy, social justice, unemployment reduction, and job creation is likely
to exert greater pressure on the new political actors to explore new ways to
foster economic growth. This could provide unprecedented incentives for
improving regional cooperation. 
The deteriorating conditions of some Middle Eastern economies, along with
the demographic growth of the population, represent a further challenge and
opportunity to the region as a whole. Moreover, high-intensity conflicts, like
the Syrian civil war, are liable to affect the political and economic stability of
neighboring countries. The influx of people from Syria has been generating a
huge humanitarian disaster, which requires urgent measures. Reviewing
existing coordination mechanisms among national, regional, and international
players—at both the governmental and nongovernmental levels—provides a
foundation for critical thinking, possible adaptations, and creative new
approaches. The continuing absence of strengthened regional cooperation has
the potential to exacerbate the bulk of conflicts and security threats. Those
threats are furthermore interwoven with a persisting lack of responses to
domestic social demands; empirical evidence, for instance, has proved that
there is a linkage between the proliferation of terrorism and long-standing,
stagnant underdevelopment. From this perspective, this paper will elucidate
what factors have supported and limited attempts at regional cooperation in
the Middle East, particularly focusing on the analysis of regional initiatives
concerning the Arab world. 
The paper, first, outlines attempts at regionalism undertaken by Arab states.
Second, it examines exogenous projects, distinguishing between EU-led, US-
led, and international multilateral initiatives.
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2Regionalism in the Arab
Middle East
Despite the many endogenous and exogenous
regional initiatives that have been undertaken since
1945, regionalism in the Arab Middle East has
brought about mostly unsatisfactory outcomes.
Different features of the political and economical
structure of Arab states can explain the limited
results of those attempts.
LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES
The first attempt at regionalism in the Arab Middle
East has been represented by the foundation of the
League of Arab States—or Arab League (AL)—in
1945.1 The AL was created in the wake of “Pan-
Arabism,” the ideological and political project of
unifying all the Arab people under the shelter of a
single Arab Nation (Umma ‘arabiyya).2
Despite this strong vocation to “Arab unity,” since
the end of 1960s, the opposite has taken place: state
sovereignties have been consolidated and crystal-
ized into an interstate order, which has in turn
hindered the consolidation of supranational
organizations. Indeed, Arab states have designed
weak regional institutions that don’t affect
sovereignty. This is very apparent in the decision-
making process: the AL functions as an intergov-
ernmental negotiating framework rather than as a
supranational organization. For instance, among
the objectives of the AL, the most important was
the establishment of the Arab Common Market.
The project traces back to the Nasser’s era but it
remains unaccomplished.3
Structural disparities among the member states
exacerbate the complexity of fostering regional
integration. First of all, different regime types
(conservative monarchies, modernist republics,
and semi-democracies) tend to elaborate different
political agendas. Second, significant disparities in
wealth, particularly between rich states with low
population density (e.g., Qatar, with a per capita
GDP of $92,5014 and a population of 1.918
million5) and poor states with high population
density (e.g., Yemen, with a per capita GDP of
$1,3616 and a population of 24.527 million7) also
tend to thwart Arab integration. External
influences and international alliances also have an
exacerbating effect on intra-regional divisions. 
Finally, the AL’s performance in conflict resolu-
tion is ambiguous. In some cases, such as in the
settlement of the Lebanese civil war (1975–1990),
ended by the Ta’ef agreements of 1990, AL’s action
has been decisive. In other cases, however, the AL
has appeared weak, since it is difficult for member
states to achieve a common position. During the
1990–91 Gulf War and the Libyan civil war (2011)
Arab states opted for appealing to the UN Security
Council to settle the conflict. With respect to the
post-2011 Syria case, however, the AL has signifi-
cantly improved multilateral political decision-
making, suspending Syrian membership in
November 2011. Such an unprecedented decision
marks a significant recognition of human rights by
the Arab League.
GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL (GCC)8
According to its charter, the GCC promotes “co-
ordination, integration, and co-operation among
the member-states in all fields [economic, political,
and security].”9
The GCC is an example of subregional coopera-
tion that has reached a level of success, compared to
other regional organizations in the Middle East.
GCC institutions are vaguely inspired by European
regionalism. They consist of the following: 
1) the Supreme Council, which brings together
the six heads of state once a year to set the
principles of GCC policies and acts as the
Commission for the Settlement of Disputes; 
2) the Ministerial Council, which is composed of
member-state foreign ministers and meets
1 The AL is among the oldest attempts at regionalism. It was founded even before the United Nations. 
2 Pan-Arabism strongly characterized the 1940s and 1950s.
3 It is noteworthy that the 2009 Sharm el-Sheikh Arab Socio-Economic Summit paid lip service to Arab economic integration. Arab leaders only agreed to establish an
Arab common market by 2020 without a detailed timeline and steps for follow up. 
4 World Bank Data, 2011, available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD .
5 Government of Qatar, official statistics, available at www.qsa.gov.qa/eng/PopulationStructure.htm . 
6 World Bank Data, 2011.
7 Government of Yemen, official statistics, available at www.cso-yemen.org/content.php?lng=arabic&id=553 .
8 Members: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates.
9 GCC Charter, available at www.gcc-sg.org/eng/ .
every three months; and 
3) the General Secretariat, which is a permanent
body located in Riyadh that supervises and
supports the implementation of the GCC
policies. 
Contrary to the Arab Middle East as a whole, the
subregional reality of the GCC is marked by signif-
icant homogeneity. The oil and gas sector accounts
on average for 44 percent of the GDP and for
roughly 81-89 percent of the government revenues,
with the exception of the United Arab Emirates.10
They are all marked by similar regime type
(absolute or constitutional monarchies) and by
common security concerns.11 Indeed, GCC
members have a common perception of external
threats: i.e., Iran after the 1979 Islamic revolution
and Iraq as a historical regional challenger. Also,
since members have a common sense of internal
security, the likelihood of an inter-GCC war is
minimized. From this perspective, the GCC
member states endeavor to establish their defense
forces according to a common idea: unified
operational procedures, training, and military
curricula. Furthermore, unlike the regional pan-
Arab space, the GCC is ordered by a subregional
hegemonic power, Saudia Arabia. The member
states share common characteristics and views on
world issues, which appear very clearly in UN
voting patterns. Finally, the GCC promotes labor
mobility for their citizens. For example, they can
travel from one state to another within the Gulf
region with their national IDs rather than
passports. 
There are some factors that still curb the GCC
from achieving integration: First, all of the GCC
states, except Saudi Arabia, face a lack of human
resources, and are heavily dependent on oil exports.
Oil dependence is at once a factor of strength and of
weakness. Indeed, any security threat liable to risk
oil provision routes is likely to tremendously affect
GCC economic sustainability. Second, all of the
Arab GCC states’ security is strongly dependent on
the US as an external security provider. Third, there
are some border disputes between some of the GCC
states, such as the one between Qatar and Bahrain
over the Hawar Islands, which was addressed by the
International Court of Justice rather than by the
GCC. 
On the whole, however, the GCC can be consid-
ered the most successful example of subregional
integration in the Middle East. 
ARAB MAGHREB UNION
The agreement to found the Arab Maghreb Union
(AMU) was signed in Marrakesh in February 1989
among Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and
Tunisia. It aimed to establish a Maghreb parlia-
ment, bank, university, and court. The treaty grants
decision-making power to the presidential council,
which was originally supposed to meet every six
months and reach decisions through consensus.
The goal was to mirror the European Union model,
and it aimed for similar economic integration in
terms of a common market and currency, as well as
to foster extensive political cooperation. For
instance, in 1994, member states of the AMU
agreed to a regional free trade zone. 
Despite the many rhetorical and diplomatic
efforts, the AMU remains one of the least successful
attempts at regionalism. Indeed, although it was
originally also thought of as a framework to settle
the Western Sahara conflict between Algeria and
Morocco, the two countries have been unable to put
an end to their hostile relationship, which dates
back to the 1963 Sand War. 
Moreover, at the time of its creation, intratrade
among AMU member states only reached 3 percent
of the entire trade volume of the region, and this
figure remained unchanged over ten years.12 In
1993, when the European Community became the
European Union, the importance of EU trade to
individual states persuaded Morocco, Tunisia, and
later Algeria to sign bilateral trade agreements with
the EU.
GREATER ARAB FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT (GAFTA)
The establishment of GAFTA followed the
adoption of the agreement to facilitate and develop
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10 See UN Information on National Statistical Systems, available at  http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/inter-natlinks/sd_natstat.asp ; IMF Data and Statistics,
available at www.imf.org/external/data.htm ; Indexmundi statistics, available at www.indexmundi.com/middle_east.html; CIA World Factbook, available at
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/wfbExt/region_mde.html .
11 Monarchical regime type seems to be an important requisite. To this end, it is noteworthy that in 2011 GCC has offered membership to Jordan and Morocco, the
two non-Gulf Arab monarchies.
12 While it was 60.2 percent in the EU, 22.3 percent in the ASEAN, and 19.9 percent for the Mercosur.
4inter-Arab trade in 1981 by the Arab League’s
Economic and Social Council. It was originally
founded by fourteen countries and currently
includes seventeen countries that have agreed on a
progressive elimination of trade barriers. Being in
force since January 1, 1998, GAFTA reached full
trade liberalization of goods through the full
exemption of customs duties and charges. The
internal trade among the members represents 96
percent of the entire intra-Arab trade.13 From this
perspective, GAFTA could have been a really
efficient agreement that could have brought
regional cooperation. However, a substantial
absence of a real, precise, and feasible implementa-
tion plan seems to have limited the results.
Moreover, the improvement of trade exchanges is
affected by the lack of economic complementarity
(see below). 
AGADIR AGREEMENT
The 2004 Agadir agreement for the establish –
ment of a free trade zone between the Arab
Mediterranean Nations, which came into force in
2007, is aimed at establishing a free trade area
between Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia. It
was seen as a possible first step in the establishment
of the Euro-Mediterranean free trade area as
envisaged in the Barcelona Process, which aimed to
transform the Mediterranean basin into an area of
dialogue and free exchange. It is also open to
further membership by all of the Arab states that
are members of the Arab League and GAFTA. It
uses the Euro-Mediterranean rules of origin, which
allow for diagonal accumulation of origin among its
member countries.14 Furthermore, the EU allows its
Mediterranean free trade partners to cumulate
value-added. In other words, it turns a blind eye to
where value was added as long as it was in a free
trade-agreement partner country. (Conversely, the
United States only assesses value-added domesti-
cally in the country exporting to the US). 
The project is still upright and has hitherto
received 4 million euros from the EU. It is
noteworthy that the agreement is open to all of the
Arab countries that enjoy trade relations with the
EU in order to facilitate the EU-Mediterranean
integration process. Therefore, although the
expected results have not been fully achieved, it




• Weak institutions at both state and regional
levels: Political-diplomatic coordination occurs
more at a personal-informal level than in the
pursuit of shared norms and values. 
• National interest vs. integration interests: From
a functionalist perspective, regionalism entails
the harmonization of domestic state structures;
for liberalization and integration to succeed,
there must be a political coalition that favors both
over all alternatives, including the status quo.
Nevertheless, Arab regimes have appeared to be
particularly concerned with maintaining the
domestic status quo, to the detriment of reforms
and adjustment policies.
• Lack of democracy: It is not clear whether the
presence of authoritarian regimes can represent
an obstacle to regionalism. Authoritarianism is
commonly associated with a lack of democracy
and accountability, which in turn brings about
mistrust at the interstate level. However, the case
of ASEAN would suggest that regionalism can be
successful despite authoritarian regimes being
members of regional projects. From the opposite
perspective, a link between robust regionalism
and democratic consolidation has been proved to
exist, as the cases of Europe and Latin America
demonstrate.15 After 2011, however, the
occurrence of transparent, democratic elections,
along with the demand for democracy, are more
likely to exert pressure on new governments to
implement reforms. 
• External penetration of the region: The Middle
Eastern history of foreign domination has no
parallels elsewhere. The asymmetry between
Middle Eastern states and international powers is
thought to have obstructed regional cooperation.
13 IBP USA, Arab States Business Law Handbook (Washington: International Business Publications, 2008), p. 18.
14 For an explanation of diagonal accumulation, which encourages greater regionalization of manufacturing, see World Customs Organization definition, available at
www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/origin/instrument-and-tools/comparative-study-on-preferential-rules-of-origin/specific-topics/study-annex/cum-dia-abs.aspx .
15 It is noteworthy that Turkey’s efforts to accomplish a democratic transition in the last decade have been directed toward joining the EU, rather than improving
relations with their Middle Eastern neighbors.
Moreover, binding bilateral alliances between
superpowers and specific regimes, corroborated
by economic and security dependence, have
discouraged the implementation of economic
and security coordination among regional states.
ECONOMIC
• Rentier Economies: Most of the Middle Eastern
states are characterized by a rentier or semi-
rentier economic structure, i.e., high dependency
on externally-derived and unproductively-earned
payments. Rent can be royalties or payments
associated to oil and gas exports. Gulf states are
considered pure rentier states, for their depend-
ence on oil (or gas) exports, which account for
more than 50 percent of budget revenues. In
some cases, such as Saudi Arabia, oil production
guarantees over 80 percent of budget revenues.
Rentier economies are associated with the so-
called “Dutch disease,” i.e., the relation between a
strong state’s dependence on natural resources
and the scarce competitiveness of its manufac-
turing sector. In brief, unproductive high
revenues make the productive sector atrophy. 
Beyond oil, there are other factors that can
generate a “rentier effect.” Some specific fees,
such as those assessed to cross the Suez Canal, as
well as military and external aid are also typically
considered rents.16 Foreign remittances are also a
subject of controversy. Some economists consider
them as a positive factor for developing
economies. Some others consider foreign
remittances as a “non-governmental rent,”
ultimately producing a distorted effect on the
economy, inhibiting the potential stimuli to
national production. 
• Lack of complementarity: Middle Eastern states
(except Turkey and Israel) are very similar in
what they export and what they import. After the
failure of ISI (import-substitution-industrial -
ization) strategies, typical of developing
economies during the 1960s, Middle Eastern
states, unlike Latin American or Asian countries,
have not reconceptualized industrialization. The
increasing dependence on oil and other rent
sources since the 1970s, and the interrelated
“Dutch Disease,” have heavily discouraged the
industrial sector. Complementarity is one of the
basic features of regional integration. In well-
integrated regions like the EU or the North
American Trade Association (NAFTA) the
complementarity index17 exceeds fifty, while in the
Middle East it is very low, with oil-states rarely
exceeding twenty. Only Lebanon and Syria send
half of their non-oil exports to regional markets.
• Low levels of intra-regional trade: Similar
economic structures explains the scarce Middle
Eastern states’ interest (particularly the Arab
states) in trading among themselves. Indeed,
intra-regional trade in the Arab world range
between 6 and 9 percent. In a comparative
perspective, intra-EU trade is between 55 and 66
percent, and in South America intra-
MERCOSUR trade is between 11 and 23 percent.
• Business communities: The business sector is
generally considered a vector for openness and
growth, as well as for democracy. However,
Middle Eastern business communities are heavily
dependent on political power, which is a very
discretionary provider of business opportunities,
for it arbitrarily distributes or denies access to
private capital and to national and international
markets. This dynamic is often defined as “crony
capitalism,” since it describes the peculiar
distorted complicity between economic and
political power.
• High tariffs: Despite the substantial number of
regional agreements to liberalize trade, tariff rates
remain high. The average trading tariff for Arab
countries is estimated at 17 percent, while
European, American, Russian, and Asian tariffs
range between 8–13 percent. Nontariff barriers to
trade are more substantial in the Arab Middle
East than in any other region of the world. 
• Intra-Arab Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows:
Global FDI inflows have increased at a rate of 141
percent from 1998 to 2008, while FDI inflows in
Arab countries increased at the rate of 630
percent, thus twelve times faster than that of the
rest of the world. Nonetheless, FDI flows into the
Arab countries still did not exceed 6 percent of
the total in 2008 (compared to the 0.8 percent of
1998). This shows that no decisive measure has
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16 After 1977, for instance, Egypt has received on average $1.2 billion in US military aid and $250 million of economic assistance annually. 
17 The complementarity index compares the similarity between the product mix in one country’s export basket and another country import basket.
been taken to create better business opportunities
and to improve Arab economies. This is due to
two principal reasons: 1) there is a particular FDI
concentration in GCC countries; 2) investments
go to “short horizon” sectors, such as services and
real estate, but less to the industrial or agriculture
sectors, which would be likely to create more job
opportunities, along with more sustainable
growth. Moreover, there are low rates of Arab
FDI inflows in the region: more than two-thirds
of the total inflows come from non-Arab actors.
FDI intra-regional flows are liable to sudden
variations, since they are strongly dependent on
excess of liquidity due to high oil prices.
However, since 2000, Arab countries have been
searching for investment opportunities in other
Arab countries, in order to compensate for the
loss in extra-Arab FDI. This new trend is consid-
ered to be very important for Arab integration.
• Lack of transportation: Compared to the
Ottoman era, when the Hejaz railway connected
Arab capitals and served to drive regional
integration, the current status of regional
transports appears largely underdeveloped. Rail
in Morocco stops at the Algerian border; in the
Gulf, only Saudi Arabia has a rail system, which
connects Riyadh to Damman, the capital of the
oil-rich Eastern Province. Less than 10 percent of
track is double track and less than 3 percent is
electrified. Many plans for rail projects are
underway but they halted in 2011. Gulf countries
have already invested several billion dollars.
Some EU initiatives, such as the Money, Market,
Mobility Strategy (see below), are supervising
some rail projects, for example, in Jordan. 
SECURITY
• Iran-Gulf States rivalry: The rivalry between the
Islamic Republic of Iran and the monarchies of
the Gulf has prevented the emergence of a new
security framework in the subregion.
European Initiatives to
Develop Regionalism in the
Middle East
Europe has provided a variety of frameworks for
developing regionalism in the Middle East. First of
all, geographic proximity makes the two regional
spaces naturally interdependent. EU-MENA
relations are marked by a strong mutual interest in
fostering regional cooperation between the north
and the south of the Mediterranean Sea. On the one
hand, non-EU Mediterranean countries need
foreign aid to assist in stimulating economic
growth. On the other hand, European policies have
been also very focused on security issues and based
on the idea that a prosperous neighborhood would
be peaceful and non-challenging for the security of
the EU territorial space. Ultimately, it is noteworthy
that the EU is the main trade partner of all the
Middle Eastern countries.
EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has passed
through different phases since 1970 onwards. After
the first Mediterranean Policy (1972–1992) and the
so-called Renovated Mediterranean Policy
(1992–1995), the most recent phase started in 1995
in the framework of the Barcelona Process.
Barcelona’s ultimate goal was “turning the
Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue,
exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace,
stability and prosperity.”18 The initiative flourished
in the wake of the post-Cold War esprit du temps,
i.e., an atmosphere characterized by enthusiasm for
the diffusion of democracy and the free market.
In the Middle East the historical juncture was
strongly marked by the Gulf War (1990–91), the
Madrid Conference (1992), and the Arab-Israeli
peace process.
The Barcelona Process was articulated in four
chapters: 1) Politics and Security, 2) Economics and
Trade, 3) Socio-cultural, and 4) Justice and Interior
Affairs. Ultimately, it was based on the principle of
multilateralism. 
The European Security Strategy (ESS) was
launched in 2003, with the motto “A Secure Europe
in a Better World.” Solving the Arab-Israeli conflict
6
18 Barcelona Declaration, available at http://ec.europa.eu/research/iscp/pdf/barcelona_declaration.pdf .
was affirmed to be a strategic priority for Europe.
In 2004, the European Neighbourhood Policy
(ENP) was inaugurated. It was not contradictory to
the Barcelona Process but it was aimed to adjust it,
shifting from a multilateralism orientation towards
a country-by-country dialogue. 
In 2008, under the impulse of France, the Union
for the Mediterranean (UfM) was created. Focused
on projects in the water sector, energy sector, and
job creation, the UfM was grounded on the belief
that security would be achieved through boosting
economic development. Unlike the Barcelona
Process it removed the “democratic conditionality”
of the regimes to enter the multilateral setting.
In April 2011, in the wake of the Arab Spring, the
EU launched a new policy: the Money, Market,
Mobility (MMM) Strategy.  The policy focused on
the following concepts:
• Money: “[R]esources that can go into the region
to help the transition to democracy, the support
for civil society and of course the economic needs
of countries . . .”
• Market access: “[T]he importance of making sure
that we give advantages in trade and the people
can take advantage of that by being able to export
and import properly.”
• Mobility: “[T]he ability of people to move
around, for business people to be able to conduct
business more effectively.”19
Challenges for EU Initiatives
POLITICAL
EU strategy in the Middle East is characterized by
many overlapping initiatives. While this denotes
the ability of the EU to adjust its policies in relation
to changing context, a general lack of a uniform
strategy has also led to tensions. The UfM, for
instance, has brought about inter-European
rivalries.
Moreover, from Barcelona to the ENP, the transi-
tion from a multilateral approach to a unilateral
approach remains controversial. On the one hand,
this policy shifting was officially justified by the fact
that potential competitiveness would be frustrated
by a multilateral approach. On the other hand, it is
evident that favoring bilateralism over multilater-
alism is contrary to the very idea of regionalism.
Ultimately, it might be considered that the EU was
not able to smooth over the hostility among the
involved states, in particular the rivalry between
Arab States and Israel. 
ECONOMIC
While the EU has supported the raw material
exports of Middle Eastern countries, it has not been
able to promote the development of economies of
scale, which would improve intraregional trade. 
SECURITY
Given the different foreign policy attitudes of EU
members, Europe was not able to play a role in
conflict resolution in the late 2008–early 2009 Gaza
War between Israel and Palestinian militants or in
the March 2012 Israeli operation into Gaza.
US Initiatives
QUALIFIED INDUSTRIAL ZONES (QIZs)
The QIZs are an extension of the already
established US-Israel Free Trade Agreement. Those
agreements allow certain products from identified
industrial zones in Egypt, Jordan, the Gaza Strip,
and the West Bank to be exported to the US market
duty free. Goods that are jointly produced by Israel
and either Jordan or Egypt are entitled to enter the
United States duty free and without any quota limit.
The agreement requires specific rules of origin but
does not require reciprocal treatment by Egypt or
Jordan. Far from being a regional trade agreement
(RTA) or a free trade agreement (FTA), market
access is granted by only one partner, the 
United States.
From the US perspective, this promotes peace in
the region through economic development and
integration by fostering trade among Israel and the
other Arab states of the QIZs. From this perspec-
tive, although QIZs don’t comply with the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or World
Trade Organization (WTO) rules, they were never
challenged because of the political sensitivity of the
scenario and the aim behind it: peace.
QIZs were also meant to achieve normalization
REGIONALISM AND REGIONALIZATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST 7
19 For further details, please see EU External Action, available at http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2011/171211_arabsprin_en.htm .
20 Quoted in Hassan A. Barari, Israeli Politics and the Middle East Peace Process: 1988–2002 (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 104.
between Israel and its Arab neighbors by
implementing a practical economic interdepend-
ence between them (QIZs were driven from the
experience of the European Steel and Coal
Community in 1952, which aimed at preventing a
potential war between Germany and France). 
The thirteen QIZs have had a positive economic
impact on Jordan and Egypt—even if they are
dwarfed by the challenges posed by the overall
political economy of those two countries—and  less
so in Morocco. Furthermore, QIZs have been
unsuccessful in improving technological transfers
to Arab countries and in providing them modern-
ized vocational training programs in order to
encourage the hiring of more people. More success
in this area would call for a complete overhaul of
vocational training in each of these countries,
which is outside the scope of regionalist efforts.
MIDDLE EAST FREE TRADE AREA
INITIATIVE (MEFTA), 2003
With the goal of creating a regional free trade
agreement in 2013, MEFTA envisages graduated
steps for Middle Eastern nations to increase trade
and investment with the United States and with
other international actors. 
The initiative was conceived as led by the US to
work closely with the countries that want to
become members of the WTO, in order to facilitate
their accession to it. According to the MEFTA
strategy, the US would pursue specific strategies to
enhance trade and investment relations, each
strategy tailored to the relevant country’s level of
development. 
The conditionality required by Middle Eastern
countries involved is the implementation of
domestic reform agendas, the institution of the rule
of law, the protection of property rights, and the
creation of a foundation for openness and
economic growth. 
Bilateral FTAs with Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco,
and Oman have already entered into effect. The
United States supports the WTO accession efforts
of Algeria, Lebanon, and Yemen, and has also taken
steps to revive dialogues with other key trading
partners in the region, including Egypt and Saudi
Arabia.
Challenges for US Initiatives
POLITICAL
• Double standard: The US-Israeli “special rela -
tionship” has been mistrusted by other Middle
Eastern countries, that have accused the US of
only pursuing Israeli interests.
• Credibility: Middle Eastern public opinion
reflects a general hostility to American policies in
the region over the last decade.
• External hegemony: the US has acted as an
external hegemon in the Middle East. External
impulses may be important in the start-up of
regionalism, whether in Africa, Europe, or
elsewhere, but in consolidating regionalism
endogenous coordination is needed. 
ECONOMIC
• Bilateral agreements signed by the US and other




G8 BROADER MIDDLE EAST AND
NORTH AFRICA (BMENA) INITIATIVE
The goal was establishing genuine cooperation
among governments, the private sector, and
regional civil society.
The inaugural Forum for the Future held in Rabat
in December 2004 established a process of dialogue
among G8 and regional governments in pursuit of
strengthening freedom, democracy, and prosperity
for all. The initiative has been focused on civil
society groups and partner countries with the aim
of fostering transparency and good governance,
democratic participation, women’s empowerment,
legal reform, and human rights.
The yearly Forum for the Future is a centrepiece
of the BMENA, since it provides an international
venue to support the reform voices in the region: it
permits the partners and other supportive
countries and organizations to engage in political,
economic, and social reform on a regular basis.
G8 DEAUVILLE PARTNERSHIP
The G8 Deauville Partnership is an international
project elaborated in 2011 by the G8 to support
8
countries in the Arab world engaged in a transition
toward free, democratic, and tolerant societies in
the wake of the Arab Spring. The Partnership
includes: 
• states;21
• international financial institutions and organiza-
tions committed to supporting reform in Egypt,
Jordan, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia; and
• several other supporting organizations,
including, the Arab League, the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), and the United Nations. 
At the 2012 Camp David Summit, G8 Leaders
recognized the important progress that has been
achieved in a number of countries undergoing
transition and committed to maintaining their
support for these transitions in four key priority
areas: stabilization, job creation, participation/
governance, and integration.
One of the most promising initiatives under the
shelter of the G8 Deauville Summit Declaration on
the Arab Spring is the encouragement of multi-
donor partnership investments in solar power
development as a priority. Indeed, abundance of
sunshine, deserts, and proximity to the EU makes
North Africa the most potentially competitive
location for concentrated solar power in the world.
It is important to mention also the Mediterranean
Solar Plan (MSP) under the supervision of the UfM.
The MSP aims at developing twenty gigawatts of
renewable electricity capacity, along with
infrastructures for energy interconnection with the
EU by 2020. 
Solar power offers challenges and opportunities.
The most important challenge stems from coordi-
nating international and domestic action to
overcome the traditional obstacle of higher costs of
solar energy, compared to fossil fuel alternatives.
On the other hand, however, developing the solar
power sector is liable to produce unprecedented
outcomes, specifically concerning jobs creation and
positive environmental effects.
It is without doubt that the international financial
crisis has limited the impact of external financial
support to Arab countries in the last few years, and
especially after 2011. Indeed, many projects remain
on paper and are likely never to be implemented.
Ultimately, the underway transitions—some of
them extremely challenging in the immediate
aftermath of 2011 uprisings—bring about great
incertitude, thus discouraging investors and donors
to effectively implement agreed upon projects.
Conclusion
This paper illustrates a series of crucial features that
have impacted on the activity of regional institu-
tions and organizations in the Middle East. It
highlights how the general lack of political coordi-
nation among the Arab states has constituted a
major hindering factor. This, in turn, depends on
historical rivalries and structural disparities in
wealth and power. A huge gap can be identified
between the great number and variety of regional
projects launched in the Middle East and the
extremely modest objectives achieved so far. 
However, it would be ungenerous to consider
Middle East regionalism as an overall failed experi-
ence. It is, for instance, true that the mandate of the
Arab League has largely remained on paper since
1945 onwards. However, it is noteworthy that post-
Cold War coordination with international organi-
zations has improved the ability of the AL to settle
crucial political issues. The suspension of Syrian
membership, in light of the human rights violations
witnessed during the civil war that erupted in 2011,
serves as an elucidating example. 
Moreover, when it comes to subregional organi-
zations, evaluation on single experiences leads to
draw very different conclusion. The GCC, for
instance, has created the conditions for more active
coordination between the Gulf kingdoms, while the
Arab Maghreb Union has proved to be unable to
overcome historical frictions. In some other cases,
there are prospects for revitalizing the existing
structures. More recent agreements, such as the
GAFTA or Agadir, can indeed serve as institutional
frameworks for launching renovated policies in
light of the post-2011 juncture.
Yet overall, the development of closer ties among
regional institutions with extra-regional ones can
constitute the first step towards increasing
efficiency of stagnant projects. From this 
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perspective, the EU, US, and international-multilat-
eral projects underway might work in compliance
with regional actors in order to strengthen the
existing endogenous potential. 
A deeper reflection on the post-Arab Spring
context may also be needed. The 2011 uprisings
very clearly brought to the surface the need for
improving domestic socioeconomic conditions.
From this perspective, a positive signal stems from
the fact that underway projects prioritize job
creation and improving productive structures. This
is the first step for reaching domestic political
stability, which is in turn a fundamental requisite
for fostering regional cooperation. Improving
productive activities might also go with a more
systematic pursuing of economic complementarity,
in order to improve intraregional trade and
regional economic  integration. In the long run,
increased production can also attenuate rent
dependence and discourage rent-seeking
mechanisms, which are proved to be at odds with
the development of democratic governance. 
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